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ABSTRACT 
The aim of this study is to examine the effect of bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants of bank profitability, using an empirical framework that 
incorporates the traditional Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis. To 
account for profit persistence, we apply a GMM technique to a panel of Greek banks 
that covers the period 1985-2001. The estimation results show that profitability 
persists to a moderate extent, indicating that departures from perfectly competitive 
market structures may not be that large. All bank-specific determinants, with the 
exception of size, affect bank profitability significantly in the anticipated way. 
However, no evidence is found in support of the SCP hypothesis. Finally, the business 
cycle has a positive, albeit asymmetric effect on bank profitability, being significant 
only in the upper phase of the cycle.   
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1. Introduction 
During the last two decades the banking sector has experienced worldwide 
major transformations in its operating environment. Both external and domestic 
factors have affected its structure and performance. Despite the increased trend 
toward bank disintermediation observed in many countries, the role of banks remains 
central in financing economic activity in general and different segments of the market 
in particular. A sound and profitable banking sector is better able to withstand 
negative shocks and contribute to the stability of the financial system. Therefore, the 
determinants of bank performance have attracted the interest of academic research as 
well as of bank management, financial markets and bank supervisors. 
The majority of studies on bank profitability, such as Short (1979), Bourke 
(1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and 
Goddard et al. (2004), use linear models to estimate the impact of various factors that 
may be important in explaining profits. Even though these studies show that it is 
possible to conduct a meaningful analysis of bank profitability,1 some issues are not 
dealt with sufficiently. First, the literature principally considers determinants of 
profitability at the bank and/or industry level, with the selection of variables 
sometimes lacking internal consistency, while there is no thorough investigation of 
the effect of the macroeconomic environment, owing partly to the small time 
dimension of the panels used in the estimation. Second, in most of the literature, the 
econometric methodology is not adequately described and/or does not account for 
some features of bank profits (e.g. persistence), which implies that the estimates 
obtained may be biased and inconsistent. 
This paper investigates, in a single equation framework, the effect of bank-
specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants on bank profitability. The 
group of the bank-specific determinants of profitability involves operating efficiency 
and financial risk. Size is also included to account for the effect of economies of 
scale. The second group of determinants describes industry-structure factors that 
affect bank profits, which are not the direct result of managerial decisions. These are 
industry concentration and the ownership status of banks. The Structure-Conduct-
                                                 
1 For a general framework of analysis that incorporates alternative models of bank profitability, see 
Bikker and Bos (2004). 
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Performance hypothesis figures prominently among theories that relate market power 
to bank profitability. The third group of determinants relates profitability to the 
macroeconomic environment within which the banking system operates. In this 
context, we include cyclical output and expected inflation among the explanatory 
variables. The current study represents one of the few attempts to identify the 
relationship between business cycle and bank profitability, and in doing so we use, on 
the one hand, a panel whose time dimension covers all the phases of the business 
cycle and, on the other, alternative techniques to measure the cycle. 
We utilize data from the Greek banking sector over a relatively long period 
(1985-2001). In specifying the model we account for profit persistence using a 
dynamic panel data estimation procedure. The empirical results suggest that bank-
specific determinants, excluding size, significantly affect bank profitability in line 
with prior expectations. The evidence also indicates that profitability is procyclical, 
the effect of the business cycle being asymmetric. It is noteworthy that the industry 
variables are not important in explaining bank profitability, even though the Greek 
banking system evolved dynamically during the sample period (sizeable changes in 
industry concentration, entry of new banks, privatizations and M&As) and the market 
share of publicly-owned banks remained high (though it followed a declining trend).   
 The paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 discusses the 
existing literature on bank profitability. Section 3 describes the industry structure and 
the model specification. Section 4 presents the estimation method and the empirical 
results. Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Literature review 
 In the literature, bank profitability is usually expressed as a function of 
internal and external determinants. The internal determinants originate from bank 
accounts (balance sheets and/or profit and loss accounts) and therefore could be 
termed micro or bank-specific determinants of profitability. The external determinants 
are variables that are not related to bank management but reflect the economic and 
legal environment that affects the operation and performance of financial institutions. 
A number of explanatory variables have been proposed for both categories, according 
to the nature and purpose of each study.  
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The research undertaken has focused on profitability analysis of either cross-
country or individual countries’ banking systems. The first group of studies includes 
Haslem (1968), Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) and 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000). A more recent study in this group is Bikker and 
Hu (2002), though it is different in scope; its emphasis is on the bank profitability-
business cycle relationship. Studies in the second group mainly concern the banking 
system in the US (e.g. Berger et al., 1987 and Neely and Wheelock, 1997) or the 
emerging market economies (e.g. Barajas et al., 1999). All of the above studies 
examine combinations of internal and external determinants of bank profitability.2 
The empirical results vary significantly, since both datasets and environments differ. 
There exist, however, some common elements that allow a further categorization of 
the determinants.  
 Studies dealing with internal determinants employ variables such as size, 
capital, risk management and expenses management. Size is introduced to account for 
existing economies or diseconomies of scale in the market. Akhavein et al. (1997) and 
Smirlock (1985) find a positive and significant relationship between size and bank 
profitability. Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998) suggest that the extent to which 
various financial, legal and other factors (e.g. corruption) affect bank profitability is 
closely linked to firm size. In addition, as Short (1979) argues, size is closely related 
to the capital adequacy of a bank since relatively large banks tend to raise less 
expensive capital and, hence, appear more profitable. Using similar arguments, 
Haslem (1968), Short (1979), Bourke (1989), Molyneux and Thornton (1992) Bikker 
and Hu (2002) and Goddard et al. (2004), all link bank size to capital ratios,3 which 
they claim to be positively related to size, meaning that as size increases – especially 
in the case of small to medium-sized banks – profitability rises. However, many other 
researchers suggest that little cost saving can be achieved by increasing the size of a 
banking firm (Berger et al., 1987), which suggests that eventually very large banks 
could face scale inefficiencies.   
 The need for risk management in the banking sector is inherent in the nature of 
the banking business. Poor asset quality and low levels of liquidity are the two major 
                                                 
2 Generally, the measures of profitability used are the return on assets and the return on equity (ROA 
and ROE, respectively) or variations of these. Central banks or other competent supervisory authorities 
also use the same indices to measure profitability. 
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causes of bank failures. During periods of increased uncertainty, financial institutions 
may decide to diversify their portfolios and/or raise their liquid holdings in order to 
reduce their risk. In this respect, risk can be divided into credit and liquidity risk. 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among others, find a negative and significant 
relationship between the level of liquidity and profitability. In contrast, Bourke (1989) 
reports an opposite result, while the effect of credit risk on profitability appears 
clearly negative (Miller and Noulas, 1997). This result may be explained by taking 
into account the fact that the more financial institutions are exposed to high-risk loans, 
the higher is the accumulation of unpaid loans, implying that these loan losses have 
produced lower returns to many commercial banks.  
 Bank expenses are also a very important determinant of profitability, closely 
related to the notion of efficient management. There has been an extensive literature 
based on the idea that an expenses-related variable should be included in the cost part 
of a standard microeconomic profit function. For example, Bourke (1989) and 
Molyneux and Thornton (1992) find a positive relationship between better-quality 
management and profitability.  
 Turning to the external determinants of bank profitability, it should be noted 
that we can further distinguish between control variables that describe the 
macroeconomic environment, such as inflation, interest rates and cyclical output, and 
variables that represent market characteristics. The latter refer to market 
concentration, industry size and ownership status.4  
A whole new trend about structural effects on bank profitability started with 
the application of the Market-Power (MP) and the Efficient-Structure (ES) 
hypotheses. The MP hypothesis, which is sometimes also referred to as the Structure-
Conduct-Performance (SCP) hypothesis, asserts that increased market power yields 
monopoly profits. A special case of the MP hypothesis is the Relative-Market-Power 
(RMP) hypothesis, which suggests that only firms with large market shares and well-
differentiated products are able to exercise market power and earn non-competitive 
profits (see Berger, 1995a). Likewise, the X-efficiency version of the ES (ESX) 
                                                                                                                                            
3 The most widely used variable is the equity-to-total-assets ratio. 
4 The recent literature on the influence of concentration and competition on the performance of banks is 
summarized in Berger et al. (2004). 
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hypothesis suggests that increased managerial and scale efficiency leads to higher 
concentration and, hence, higher profits.  
 Studies, such as those by Smirlock (1985), Berger and Hannan (1989) and 
Berger (1995a), investigated the profit-structure relationship in banking, providing 
tests of the aforementioned two hypotheses. To some extent the RMP hypothesis is 
verified, since there is evidence that superior management and increased market share 
(especially in the case of small-to medium-sized banks) raise profits. In contrast, weak 
evidence is found for the ESX hypothesis. According to Berger (1995a), managerial 
efficiency not only raises profits, but may lead to market share gains and, hence, 
increased concentration, so that the finding of a positive relationship between 
concentration and profits may be a spurious result due to correlations with other 
variables. Thus, controlling for the other factors, the role of concentration should be 
negligible. Other researchers argue instead that increased concentration is not the 
result of managerial efficiency, but rather reflects increasing deviations from 
competitive market structures, which lead to monopolistic profits. Consequently, 
concentration should be positively (and significantly) related to bank profitability. 
Bourke (1989), and Molyneux and Thornton (1992), among others, support this view. 
A rather interesting issue is whether the ownership status of a bank is related 
to its profitability. However, little evidence is found to support the theory that 
privately-owned institutions will return relatively higher economic profits. Short 
(1979) is one of the few studies offering cross-country evidence of a strong negative 
relationship between government ownership and bank profitability. In their recent 
work, Barth et al. (2004) claim that government ownership of banks is indeed 
negatively correlated with bank efficiency.  In contrast, Bourke (1989) and Molyneux 
and Thornton (1992) report that ownership status is irrelevant for explaining 
profitability.  
The last group of profitability determinants deals with macroeconomic control 
variables. The variables normally used are the inflation rate, the long-term interest 
rate and/or the growth rate of money supply. Revell (1979) introduces the issue of the 
relationship between bank profitability and inflation. He notes that the effect of 
inflation on bank profitability depends on whether banks’ wages and other operating 
expenses increase at a faster rate than inflation. The question is how mature an 
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economy is so that future inflation can be accurately forecasted and thus banks can 
accordingly manage their operating costs. In this vein, Perry (1992) states that the 
extent to which inflation affects bank profitability depends on whether inflation 
expectations are fully anticipated. An inflation rate fully anticipated by the bank’s 
management implies that banks can appropriately adjust interest rates in order to 
increase their revenues faster than their costs and thus acquire higher economic 
profits. Most studies (including those by Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992)) have shown a positive relationship between either inflation or long-term 
interest rate and profitability.  
Recently, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) and Bikker and Hu (2002) 
attempted to identify possible cyclical movements in bank profitability - the extent to 
which bank profits are correlated with the business cycle. Their findings suggest that 
such correlation exists, although the variables used were not direct measures of the 
business cycle. Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (2000) used the annual growth rate of 
GDP and GNP per capita to identify such a relationship, while Bikker and Hu (2002) 
used a number of macroeconomic variables (such as GDP, unemployment rate and 
interest rate differential).  
The literature describing the profitability determinants of the Greek banking 
sector is sparse.5 In an important contribution, Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) 
analyze bank- and market-specific profitability determinants for the 1993-1998 
period, using a panel not restricted to commercial banks. Their study represents one of 
the few attempts to account for profit persistence in banking, the empirical results 
suggesting that the Greek banking sector is imperfectly competitive. Market-specific 
variables such as concentration ratios and market shares were found to have a positive 
but insignificant effect on alternative measures of profitability. The effect of size is 
non-linear, with profitability initially increasing with size and then declining. 
Eichengreen and Gibson (2001) state that the effect of staff expenses is positive and 
significant, possibly due to the fact that quality is important. Other issues addressed 
are the impact of leverage and liquidity (positive and significant for both 
determinants), of ownership (insignificant) and finally of two measures of labor 
                                                 
5 The main studies include Hondroyiannis et al. (1999), Staikouras and Steliaros (1999), Eichengreen 
and Gibson (2001) and Gibson (2005). 
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productivity (value of loans and deposits per 100 workers) showing opposite effects 
on profitability. 
Overall, the existing literature provides a rather comprehensive account of the 
effect of internal and industry-specific determinants on bank profitability, but the 
effect of the macroeconomic environment is not adequately dealt with. The time 
dimension of the panels used in empirical studies is usually too small to capture the 
effect of control variables related to the macroeconomic environment (in particular 
the business cycle variable). Finally, sometimes there is an overlap between variables 
in the sense that some of them essentially proxy the same profitability determinant. It 
follows that studies concerning the profitability analysis of the banking sector should 
address the above issues more satisfactorily, in order to allow a better insight into the 
factors affecting profitability. 
  
3. Model specification and data 
3.1 Background 
 The Greek banking sector provides an interesting context for studying bank 
profitability. The sector underwent significant changes during the last two decades. 
Since the mid 1980s it was extensively liberalized through the abolition of 
administrative interventions and regulations, which seriously hampered its 
development. The reforms were adopted gradually and supported the further 
improvement of the institutional framework and the more efficient functioning of 
banks and financial markets in general. This has created a new, more competitive 
economic environment, within which the banking sector nowadays operates.  
The objective of Greece’s participation in EMU initiated efforts towards the 
further deregulation of the banking system and macroeconomic convergence. During 
the past few years, Greek banks tried to strengthen their position in the domestic 
market and acquire a size, partly through M&As, that would allow them to exploit 
economies of scale and have easier access to international financial markets. These 
changes, along with the adoption of new technology and the improvement of 
infrastructure, have been catalytic to the performance of bank profitability. In this 
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paper, we investigate the profitability of Greek commercial banks over the period 
1985 to 2001. The data sources are presented in the Appendix. 
 
3.2 The model 
The general model to be estimated is of the following linear form: TP6 PT 
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         (1) 
where ΠBitB is the profitability of bank i at time t, with i = 1,…,N; t = 1,…, T,  cB Bis a 
constant term, ΧBitBs are k explanatory variables and εBit Bis the disturbance with vBi B the 
unobserved bank-specific effect and uBitB the idiosyncratic error. This is a one-way error 
component regression model, where v Bi B ∼ IIN (0, σ P2PBvB) and independent of uBitB ∼ IIN (0, 
σ P2PBu B).  
The explanatory variables ΧBitB are grouped, according to the discussion above, 
into bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic variables. The general 
specification of model (1) with the XBitBs separated into these three groups is: 
1 1 1
,
J L M
j l m
it j it l it m it it
j l m
c X X Xβ β β ε
= = =
Π = + + + +∑ ∑ ∑ B B    (2) 
where the XBitBs with superscripts j, l and m denote bank-specific, industry-specific and 
macroeconomic determinants respectively. 
 Furthermore, bank profits show a tendency to persist over time, reflecting 
impediments to market competition, informational opacity and/or sensitivity to 
regional/macroeconomic shocks to the extent that these are serially correlated (Berger 
et al., 2000). Therefore, we adopt a dynamic specification of the model by including a 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors.TP7 PT  Eq. (2) augmented with lagged 
profitability is:  
                                                 
TP
6
PT The linearity assumption is not binding. Bourke (1989), among others, suggests that any functional 
form of bank profitability is qualitatively equivalent to the linear. 
TP
7
PT Few studies consider profit persistence in banking (see Levonian, 1993, Roland, 1997, and more 
recently, Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001, Goddard et al., 2004 and Gibson, 2005). In the industrial 
organization literature an important contribution is Geroski and Zacquemin (1988). 
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Π = + Π + + + +∑ ∑ ∑   (3) 
where ΠBi,t-1 B is the one-period lagged profitability and δ is the speed of adjustment to 
equilibrium. 
 A value of δ between 0 and 1 implies that profits persist, but they will 
eventually return to their normal (average) level. A value close to 0 means that the 
industry is fairly competitive (high speed of adjustment), while a value of δ close to 1 
implies less competitive structure (very slow adjustment).TP8 PT  
 
3.3 Determinants of bank profitability 
Table 1 lists the variables used in this study. The profitability variable is 
represented by two alternative measures: the ratio of profits to assets, i.e. the return on 
assets (ROA) and the profits to equity ratio, i.e. the return on equity (ROE).  In 
principle, ROA reflects the ability of a bank’s management to generate profits from 
the bank’s assets, although it may be biased due to off-balance-sheet activities. ROE 
indicates the return to shareholders on their equity and equals ROA times the total 
assets-to-equity ratio. The latter is often referred to as the bank’s equity multiplier, 
which measures financial leverage. Banks with lower leverage (higher equity) will 
generally report higher ROA, but lower ROE. Since an analysis of ROE disregards 
the greater risks associated with high leverage and financial leverage is often 
determined by regulation, ROA emerges as the key ratio for the evaluation of bank 
profitability (IMF, 2002). Both ROA and ROE are measured as running year 
averages.TP9 PT Fig. 1 presents ROA and ROE for the Greek banking sector. The two ratios 
follow similar paths, increasing over time with a spike in 1999. TP10 PT 
 
 
                                                 
TP
8
PT The coefficient of the lagged profitability variable takes implausible values (e.g. negative or very 
small), for small T (such as T=5) and is highly dependent on the estimation method (see Nerlove, 
2002). 
TP
9
PT For the calculation of these ratios, we use the average value of assets (or equity) of two consecutive 
years and not the end-year values, since profits are a flow variable generated during the year. 
3.3.1 Bank-specific profitability determinants  
Capital: We use the ratio of equity to assets (EA) to proxy the capital variable, 
when adopting ROA as the profitability measure.11 Also, we relax the assumptions 
underlying the model of one-period perfect capital markets with symmetric 
information.12 Firstly, the relaxation of the perfect capital markets assumption allows 
an increase in capital to raise expected earnings. This positive impact can be due to 
the fact that capital refers to the amount of own funds available to support a bank’s 
business and, therefore, bank capital acts as a safety net in the case of adverse 
developments. The expected positive relationship between capital and earnings could 
be further strengthened due to the entry of new banks into the market, the M&As that 
occurred and the significant fund-raising by banks from the Athens Stock Exchange in 
the period 1998-2000. Secondly, the relaxation of the one-period assumption produces 
an opposite causation, since it allows an increase in earnings to increase the capital 
ratio. Finally, the relaxation of the symmetric information assumption allows banks 
that expect to have better performance to credibly transmit this information through 
higher capital. In the light of the above, capital should be modeled as an endogenous 
(as opposed to a strictly exogenous) variable. 
 Credit Risk: To proxy this variable we use the loan-loss provisions to loans 
ratio (PL).13 Theory suggests that increased exposure to credit risk is normally 
associated with decreased firm profitability and, hence, we expect a negative 
relationship between ROA (ROE) and PL. Banks would, therefore, improve 
profitability by improving screening and monitoring of credit risk and such policies 
involve the forecasting of future levels of risk. Additionally, central banks set some 
specific standards for the level of loan-loss provisions to be adopted by the country’s 
banking system. In view of these standards, bank management adjusts provisions held 
for loan losses, the level of which is decided at the beginning of each period. Thus, 
credit risk should be modeled as a predetermined variable.  
                                                                                                                                            
10 In 1999, total profits, and particularly those resulting from financial transactions, exhibited a 
significant increase (more than 100%), mainly due to the boom in share prices in the Athens Stock 
Exchange. 
11 As discussed previously, it would not be appropriate to include EA in a profitability equation, when 
ROE is the dependent variable. 
12 This model and the relaxation of its assumptions are comprehensively described in Berger (1995b). 
13 Other ratios used to measure credit risk and/or liquidity risk (that produced inferior results) were 
loans/assets, loans/deposits and provisions/assets. 
 14
 Productivity: In recent years banks have faced severe competition due to the 
lowering of barriers to entry and the globalization of the industry, which has forced 
them to reorganize. They have been targeting high levels of productivity growth both 
by keeping the labor force steady and by increasing overall output. During the period 
1985-2001 labor productivity of Greek banks grew at an average annual rate of 2.5%. 
To examine whether the observed improvements in productivity growth have 
benefited bank profits, we include the rate of change in labor productivity (measured 
by real gross total revenue over the number of employees) in the model.  
Expenses management: The total cost of a bank (net of interest payments) can 
be separated into operating cost and other expenses (including taxes, depreciation 
etc.). From the above, only operating expenses can be viewed as the outcome of bank 
management. The ratio of these expenses to total assets is expected to be negatively 
related to profitability, since improved management of these expenses will increase 
efficiency and therefore raise profits. This expected negative correlation applies in 
particular to the Greek case, where personnel expenses are affected by relatively low 
productivity and the excess capacity of the larger publicly-owned banks.   
Size: One of the most important questions underlying bank policy is which 
size optimizes bank profitability. Generally, the effect of a growing size on 
profitability has been proved to be positive to a certain extent. However, for banks 
that become extremely large, the effect of size could be negative due to bureaucratic 
and other reasons. Hence, the size-profitability relationship may be expected to be 
non-linear. We use the banks’ real assets (logarithm) and their square in order to 
capture this possible non-linear relationship.14   
 
3.3.2 Industry-specific profitability determinants  
Ownership: A relationship between bank profitability and ownership may 
exist due to spillover effects from the superior performance of privately-owned banks 
compared with publicly-owned banks, which do not always aim at profit 
maximization. Although, as indicated in the literature review, there is no clear 
empirical evidence to support such a view, the peculiarity of the Greek banking sector 
                                                 
14 For a description of the effect of size on the profitability of the Greek banking sector see Eichengreen 
and Gibson (2001) and Athanasoglou and Brissimis (2004).  
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where the share of commercial banks under public ownership was relatively high until 
the early 1990s makes the examination of the hypothesis appealing. To test this 
hypothesis, we follow the literature’s suggestion in using a dummy variable. 
Alternatively, we use the market share (in terms of assets) of privately-owned banks 
in the sector.  
Concentration: We measure concentration using the ‘Herfindahl-Hirschman 
(H-H) index’.15 In the first decade of the sample period, the Greek banking industry 
could be characterized as oligopolistic (Eichengreen and Gibson, 2001). About half of 
the sector’s share belonged to the leading firm. Steadily, competitive practices 
increased through the strengthening of the private sector and the establishment of new 
commercial banks, until 1996 when a series of M&As started, causing the reversion 
of the decreasing trend of the H-H index (Fig. 2). 
  In the recent literature on the SCP hypothesis, alternative indicators of the 
degree of competition in banking are provided by the estimation of the Lerner16 and 
the Rosse-Panzar17 indices, which are usually referred to as non-structural measures 
of competition. The argument is that the structural measures (i.e. the H-H index and 
concentration ratios) were found to have a weak relationship with profitability, when 
market shares were also included in the regressions. The results generally show that 
the non-structural measures of competition are not correlated with concentration, i.e. 
competition could be present in markets even with a relatively high degree of 
concentration. However, the use of non-structural measures in the profitability 
function has some major limitations. For example, the Rosse-Panzar test can give 
misleading results if the banks in the sample have not completely adjusted to market 
conditions,18 and this leads to a bias toward the spurious appearance of market power. 
Similarly, in order to use the Lerner index, one has to effectively proxy bank output 
                                                 
15 Alternatively, the literature proposes a two-to five-firm concentration ratio involving the leading 
firms in the sector. For a review of concentration ratios and the H-H index, see Rhoades (1977).  
16 This index is defined as the difference between the product price and the marginal cost, divided by 
the product price. Some of the most important studies in this area are Angelini and Cetorelli (2003) and 
Maudos and Fernández de Guevara (2004). 
17 This index involves the econometric estimation of a total revenue function with input prices as 
explanatory variables. The summation of the relevant coefficients provides the value of the index. 
Some recent studies that applied this index in banking are Koutsomanoli and Staikouras (2004), Bikker 
and Haaf (2002), Demenagas and Gibson (2002), De Bandt and Davis (2000), Hondroyiannis et 
al.(1999) and Hardy and Simiyiannis (1998). 
18 According to Shaffer (1994, p.8), “this anticompetitive bias means that, in the absence of a reliable 
test for market disequilibrium, the Rosse-Panzar test cannot be used to rule out competitive pricing”. 
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and then estimate the marginal cost using an appropriate functional form. The 
estimation of a cost function requires several assumptions concerning the 
methodology to be used, which is beyond the scope of the present work.19 Hence, 
without denying its limitations, we proceed with using the H-H index. 
 
3.3.3 Macroeconomic profitability determinants 
Inflation expectations: As discussed in the literature review, the relationship 
between expected inflation (or long-term interest rate, which incorporates inflation 
expectations) and profitability is ambiguous. We proxy expected inflation by current 
inflation, while the long-term interest rate is measured by the 10-yr government bond 
yield. In the Greek economy, CPI inflation and the 10-yr bond yield were relatively 
high until 1990, but thereafter disinflation started, which lasted until the end of the 
sample period.   
Cyclical output: In the present study, we explore the relationship between 
bank profitability and the business cycle. There are several reasons why bank 
profitability may be procyclical. Firstly, lending could decrease during cyclical 
downswings, since such periods are normally associated with increased risk. In a 
similar context, provisions held by banks will be higher due to the deterioration of the 
quality of loans, and capital could also have a procyclical behavior, as equity tends to 
follow the phase of the cycle.   Hence, in the absence of a business cycle variable, its 
effect on profitability could be partly captured by the relevant bank-specific variables. 
Secondly, demand for credit and stock market transactions20 would be strengthened 
substantially during economic booms and the interest margin may widen. Therefore, 
revenues could grow faster than costs leading to increased profits, while the opposite 
may hold true during economic slowdowns.  
To date, the literature has not focused explicitly on the effect of the business 
cycle on bank profitability, since much of it uses cross-sections or panels with a small 
time dimension. Furthermore, the measures used to proxy the cyclical behavior of 
                                                 
19 For example, one should distinguish between technical and allocative inefficiency and different 
estimation methods.  
20 Increased stock market activity not only brings in higher commissions, but higher stock market 
prices during economic booms may lead banks to realize capital gains on their stock holdings. This 
indeed did occur in Greece in 1999. 
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economic activity are not always appropriate. The present study attempts to move a 
step further as two methods for estimating cyclical output are considered. One uses 
the deviations of real GDP from its segmented trend, while the other uses the 
deviations of GDP from the trend calculated by applying the Hodrick-Prescott (1980) 
filter.21 The two measures of the output gap are shown in Fig. 3. In periods during 
which GDP exceeds its trend, the output gap is positive, and if profitability is 
procyclical we expect it to rise. Similarly, when GDP is below trend, we expect 
profits to fall. Finally, we explore the possibility that this correlation may be 
asymmetric depending on whether the economy is above or below trend. These 
effects will be investigated by splitting the business cycle variable into two separate 
variables; the first includes the years that output gap is positive and the second the 
years that output gap is negative.  
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Econometric methodology 
The present study uses an unbalanced panel22 of Greek commercial banks 
spanning the period 1985-2001 (summary statistics of the variables used are presented 
in Table 2). Model (3) forms the basis of our estimation. In static relationships the 
literature usually applies least squares methods on Fixed or Random Effects models. 
However, in dynamic relationships these methods produce biased (especially as the 
time dimension T gets smaller) and inconsistent estimates.  
The econometric analysis of model (3) confronts the following issues: First, 
we test for stationarity of the panel, using a unit root test for unbalanced panels. 
Second, we examine whether individual effects are fixed or random. Third, we use 
techniques for dynamic panel estimation that deal with the biasedness and 
inconsistency of our estimates. Fourth, for the reasons discussed in Section 3, we 
examine whether the capital variable is endogenous and the risk variable 
                                                 
21 Other measures of cyclical output considered and estimated in this paper (but not reported, as they 
produce similar results) are the OECD index for the output gap in Greece and capacity utilisation in 
manufacturing. 
22 The panel is unbalanced since it contains banks entering or leaving the market during the sample 
period (e.g. due to mergers). Unbalanced panels are more likely to be the norm in studies of a specific 
country’s bank profitability (for a discussion on unbalanced panels, see Baltagi, 2001). Most of the 
existing literature deals with balanced panels.  
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predetermined. Finally, we check for the presence of unobservable time effects and 
the robustness of the estimates. In what follows, we discuss these issues in turn.  
The use of a relatively large T in a model of bank profitability may be 
criticized on grounds of non-stationarity of the panel. Maddala and Wu (1999) 
suggest the use of the Fisher test, which is based on combining the p-values of the 
test-statistic for a unit root in each bank. They state that not only does this test 
perform best compared to other tests for unit roots in panel data, but it also has the 
advantage that it does not require a balanced panel, as do most tests. The results of 
this test are presented in Table 3. The null of non-stationarity is rejected at the 5% 
level for all variables but size. We continue with the estimation of the model not 
excluding this variable, since we are less likely to get spurious results given that the 
dependent variable is stationary. This is especially true if exclusion of the size 
variable does not affect the model’s performance.  
The second issue is the choice between a fixed effects (FE) and a random 
effects (RE) model. As indicated by the Hausman test on model (3) (see Table 4), the 
difference in coefficients between FE and RE is systematic, providing evidence in 
favor of a FE model. Furthermore, the estimation results show that individual effects 
are present, since the relevant F-statistic is significant at the 1% level.23 However, as 
mentioned above, the least squares estimator of the FE model in the presence of a 
lagged dependent variable among the regressors is both biased and inconsistent.24 
Monte Carlo studies that measured the corresponding bias in the coefficients of the 
lagged dependent and the independent variables (see for example Judson and Owen, 
1999 or Hsiao et al., 2002) have found that the bias is significant for small values of 
T, but goes to zero as T increases. For the panel size of the present study, under 
certain values of the parameters, the average bias has been estimated to be in the 
range of 6%.25 The relatively small size of the panel (N=21) is not a serious potential 
problem according to Judson and Owen (1999).26
                                                 
23 However, it is still possible to commit a statistical error in rejecting RE for various reasons (see 
Wooldridge, 2002, pp. 288-291). 
24 See Baltagi (2001) and Matyas and Sevestre (1996).  
25 For the calculation of the bias we used the formula in Nerlove (2002). 
26 Their Monte Carlo experiments for a 20x20 panel (that is close to ours) showed an average bias not 
exceeding 5% for the coefficient of the lagged variable and less than 1% for the rest of the coefficients. 
Other studies, such as Goddard et al. (2004), have used panels with similarly-sized N. 
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The first attempt to deal with the problem of bias and inconsistency in 
dynamic models was made by Anderson and Hsiao (1982), who suggested an 
instrumental variables estimator based on the first-differenced form of the original 
equation. Arellano and Bond (1991) note that the Anderson-Hsiao estimator lacks 
efficiency as it does not exploit all the available instruments. They suggest that 
efficiency gains can be obtained by using all available lagged values of the dependent 
variable plus lagged values of the exogenous regressors as instruments.27 Yet, the 
Arellano and Bond estimator has been criticized when applied to panels with very 
small T, the argument being that under such conditions this estimator is inefficient if 
the instruments used are weak (see Arellano and Bover, 1995 and Blundell and Bond, 
1998). However, in the present study T=17, which is large enough to avoid such 
problems. Consequently, we will proceed with the estimation of our model using the 
GMM estimator in the Arellano and Bond paradigm.28      
Two issues remain to be dealt with in order to design a suitable model. Firstly, 
we should confirm that capital is better modeled as an endogenous variable and credit 
risk as a predetermined variable. We test this by running the same model twice, the 
first time with the two variables treated as strictly exogenous and the second time as 
endogenous and predetermined respectively. The results support the hypothesis that 
capital is better modeled as an endogenous variable and credit risk as predetermined 
(as the theory also suggests) since the Sargan test for over-identifying restrictions 
indicates that this hypothesis is rejected in the first case, while it is strongly accepted 
in the second.29
Finally, it is possible that, given the large time frame of our dataset and the 
developments that took place in the Greek banking sector during the sample period, 
time effects are present in the error component of the model, as follows: 
                                                 
27 Actually, Arellano and Bond proposed one- and two-step estimators. In this paper we use the one-
step GMM estimator since Monte Carlo studies have found that this estimator outperforms the two-step 
estimator both in terms of producing a smaller bias and a smaller standard deviation of the estimates 
(see Judson and Owen, 1999 and Kiviet, 1995). 
28 For a thorough description of the various GMM estimators, see Baltagi (2001), Bond (2002) and 
Hsiao et al. (2002).  
29 When EA and PL are assumed to be exogenous variables, the p-value for this hypothesis is 0.00. In 
contrast, when EA is assumed to be endogenous and PL predetermined, the p-value is 1.00, meaning 
that the instruments used are acceptable.  
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where λBt B is the unobservable time effect. The joint significance of the unobservable 
time effects is tested by the HB0 B hypothesis:   
HB0 B: λB2 B= λ B3B … = λBT B= 0,        (5) 
The relevant LM test (Table 5) shows that HB0 B is rejected at the 95% 
confidence level, implying that we should include year-specific dummy variables to 
account for λ Bt B. We experimented with many dummies and, as it turns out, the only 
significant coefficient is that of the 1999 dummy (due to the exceptional 
developments that took place in the stock market that year). Therefore, we expand Eq. 
(4) as follows: 
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                       (6) 
where DB99B is the dummy variable for the year 1999. 
The LM test for model (6) does not reject HB0 B(see Table 5) and thus we 
proceed with the estimation of this model.   
  
4.2 Results 
Table 6 reports the empirical results of the estimation of model (6) using ROA 
as the profitability variable.TP30 PT We use two alternative measures of ownership (a 
dummy variable or the market share of privately-owned banks) and of inflation 
expectations (the actual inflation rate or the long term interest rate). We also test for 
asymmetry in the effect of the business cycle by distinguishing years with positive 
and negative output gaps.  Finally, the relevant specification tests for each estimated 
equation are presented.  
                                                 
TP
30
PT In contrast, the estimations based on ROE produce inferior results (and hence they are not reported), 
as suggested by both the coefficients estimates and the specification tests. This performance may be 
related to the explanation given in Section 3. 
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The model seems to fit the panel data reasonably well, having fairly stable 
coefficients, while the Wald test indicates fine goodness of fit and the Sargan test 
shows no evidence of over-identifying restrictions. Even though the equations 
indicate that negative first-order autocorrelation is present, this does not imply that the 
estimates are inconsistent. Inconsistency would be implied if second-order 
autocorrelation was present (Arellano and Bond, 1991), but this case is rejected by the 
test for AR(2) errors (see Table 6). Comparing the FE and the GMM estimates in 
Tables 4 and 6 respectively, one notes that the results produced by the two methods 
are similar. In the first estimates, standard errors are biased, as discussed previously, 
although the bias is expected to be small. Indeed, the difference in the coefficients 
between the two estimation methods is found to be of the order of 5% to 10%.  
The highly significant coefficient of the lagged profitability variable confirms 
the dynamic character of the model specification. In the present study, δ  takes a 
value of approximately 0.35, which means that profits seem to persist to a moderate 
extent, and implies that departures from a perfectly competitive market structure in 
the Greek banking sector may not be that large. This finding is close to the estimate 
reported in Gibson (2005) for Greek banks. In contrast, Goddard et al. (2004) find 
that the statistical evidence for profit persistence in European banks is weak. 
Turning to the other explanatory variables, the coefficient of the capital 
variable (EA) is positive and highly significant, reflecting the sound financial 
condition of Greek banks. A bank with a sound capital position is able to pursue 
business opportunities more effectively and has more time and flexibility to deal with 
problems arising from unexpected losses, thus achieving increased profitability. The 
endogeneity of capital implies that the assumption of the one-period perfect capital 
markets model is not accepted for the Greek banking system. The effect of capital on 
profitability in the present study is only half of the effect found by Bourke (1989) for 
a panel of European, North American and Australian banks and by Molyneux and 
Thornton (1992) for the European banking industry, but almost the same as that found 
by Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1998) who used a large panel of banks from 80 
countries.   
As expected, credit risk is negatively and significantly related to bank 
profitability. This shows that in the Greek banking system managers, attempting to 
maximize profits, seem to have adopted a risk-averse strategy, mainly through 
policies that improve screening and monitoring credit risk.31
We find productivity growth has a positive and significant effect on 
profitability.32 This suggests that higher productivity growth generates income that is 
partly channeled to bank profits. In other words, banks increase their profits from 
improved labor productivity, which, among other things, is a result of the higher 
quality of newly hired labor and the reduction in the total number of employees. 
Operating expenses appear to be an important determinant of profitability. 
However, their negative effect means that there is a lack of efficiency in expenses 
management since banks pass part of increased cost to customers and the remaining 
part to profits, possibly due to the fact that competition does not allow them to 
“overcharge”. Clearly, efficient cost management is a prerequisite for improved 
profitability of Greek banks, which have not reached the maturity level required to 
link quality effects from increased spending to higher bank profits. 
 All estimated equations show that the effect of bank size on profitability is not 
important.33 An explanation for this may be that small-sized banks usually try to grow 
faster, even at the expense of their profitability. In addition, newly established banks 
are not particularly profitable (if at all profitable) in their first years of operation, as 
they place greater emphasis on increasing their market share, rather than on 
improving profitability. If we remove the size variable from the estimations, the rest 
of the coefficients are not affected, which implies that the non-stationarity of this 
variable does not affect the performance of the model.     
As with the effect of size, the ownership status of Greek banks appears to be 
insignificant in affecting their profitability, whether it is proxied by a dummy variable 
or by the market share of the privately-owned banks. This is a striking result since the 
market share of these banks increased from about 20% in 1985 to 45% in 2001, 
mainly due to M&As and privatizations. Despite this development, privately-owned 
                                                 
31 It should be noted that the idea of risk-averse bank-management behavior for banking sectors that 
experienced structural developments, as the Greek one, has been the subject of notable research (e.g. 
Miller and Noulas, 1997). 
32 This, however, could be partly attributed to the increased investment in fixed assets, which 
incorporates new technology.   
33 Alternatively the natural logarithm of the total value of equity and a dummy variable for the large 
and the small-sized banks were used. Indeed, size proved to be insignificant in all of the relevant 
regressions.   
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banks do not appear relatively more profitable, possibly denoting that the effects of 
M&As on bank profitability have not yet arisen. 
The empirical results show that concentration affects bank profitability 
negatively, but this effect is relatively insignificant. Hence, this study finds no 
evidence to support the SCP hypothesis. This outcome is in accordance with Berger 
(1995a) and other more recent studies, which claim that concentration is usually 
negatively related to profitability once other effects are controlled for in the 
profitability equation.34 In the present study, two shortcomings emerge: Firstly, as 
discussed above, the relatively low value of the coefficient of the lagged profitability 
variable is consistent with low market power. Secondly, and in line with Berger 
(1995a), our estimations show that even though there was a considerable fall in the H-
H index up until 1997 (when a series of mergers started to occur),35 suggesting that 
the industry was moving to a more competitive structure and hence profitability 
should have declined, the improvement of the managerial practices (captured by the 
bank-specific variables) resulted in increased profitability. 
An important finding of this study is that the business cycle significantly 
affects bank profits, even after controlling for the effect of other determinants, which 
have a strong correlation with the cycle (e.g. provisions for loan losses). We further 
test for asymmetry in the effect of the business cycle, distinguishing between periods 
in which output is above its trend value and those in which it is below (see Eq. 4 of 
Table 6). We find that the coefficient of cyclical output almost doubles when output 
exceeds its trend value. In contrast, when output is below its trend, the coefficient of 
cyclical output is insignificant. This result supports the view that banks are able to 
insulate their performance during periods of downswings.   
Finally expected inflation, as proxied by the previous period’s actual inflation, 
positively and significantly affects profitability, possibly due to the ability of Greek 
banks’ management to satisfactorily, though not fully, forecast future inflation, which 
in turn implies that interest rates have been appropriately adjusted to achieve higher 
profits. This may also be viewed as the result of bank customers’ failure (in 
                                                 
34 As mentioned above, studies like Short (1979), Bourke (1989) and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) 
find evidence to verify the SCP hypothesis.  
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comparison to bank managers) to fully anticipate inflation, implying that above 
normal profits could be gained from asymmetric information. Since during the period 
examined the Greek economy went through a disinflation process, the estimated 
positive relationship between bank profitability and inflation is associated with the 
fact that interest rates on bank deposits decreased at a faster rate than those on loans. 
Similar estimates were obtained by using the interest rate variable instead of the 
inflation variable (see Eq. 3).  
 
5.  Conclusions 
In this paper, we specified an empirical framework to investigate the effect of 
bank-specific, industry-specific and macroeconomic determinants on the profitability 
of Greek banks. Novel features of our study are the analysis of the effect of the 
business cycle on bank profitability and the use of an appropriate econometric 
methodology for the estimation of dynamic panel data models.   
We find that capital is important in explaining bank profitability and that 
increased exposure to credit risk lowers profits. Additionally, labor productivity 
growth has a positive and significant impact on profitability, while operating expenses 
are negatively and strongly linked to it, showing that cost decisions of bank 
management are instrumental in influencing bank performance. The estimated effect 
of size does not provide evidence of economies of scale in banking. Likewise, the 
ownership status of the banks is insignificant in explaining profitability, denoting that 
private banks do not in general make relatively higher profits, at least during the 
period under consideration.  Also, the SCP hypothesis is not verified, as the effect of 
industry concentration on bank profitability was found insignificant. Therefore, this 
result is in line with theoretical considerations according to which concentration is not 
related to profitability, once the other effects are controlled for in the model. 
Finally, macroeconomic control variables, such as inflation and cyclical 
output, clearly affect the performance of the banking sector. The effect of the business 
                                                                                                                                            
35 This is due to the considerable size reduction of the dominant bank of the sector, the establishment 
and development of other privately-owned banks and the inclusion of a large specialized credit 
institution as a commercial bank in the sample from 1992 onwards. 
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cycle is asymmetric since it is positively correlated to profitability only when output 
is above its trend.  
Overall, these empirical results provide evidence that the profitability of Greek 
banks is shaped by bank-specific factors (that are affected by bank-level management) 
and macroeconomic, control variables that are not the direct result of a bank’s 
managerial decisions. Yet, industry structure does not seem to significantly affect 
profitability. The approach followed in this paper may well have considerable 
potential as a tool for exploring bank profitability determinants with the purpose of 
suggesting optimal policies to bank management. 
 
Data appendix 
Net profits before taxes, total assets, total shareholders’ equity, loan loss provisions, 
the value of total loans, gross total revenue and operating expenses are all from end-
year bank balance sheets and profit/loss accounts. The total number of bank 
employees was obtained from Bank of Greece data. Market shares are calculated by 
dividing the assets of bank i with total assets of the sector, and the H-H index is 
calculated as 2( )
N
i
MS∑ , where MS is market share. Data on the CPI and real GDP 
were taken from the National Statistical Service of Greece and on the 10-yr 
government bond yield from Eurostat. Cyclical output is the logarithmic deviation of 
GDP from a segmented trend or a trend calculated on the basis of the HP filter. 
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Table 1 
Definitions, notation and the expected effect of the explanatory variables of 
model (2) on bank profitability 
 Variable Measure Notation Expected effect 
D
ep
en
de
nt
 
va
ria
bl
e 
Profitability  
Net profits before taxes / assets  
or 
Net profits before taxes / equity 
ROA 
or 
ROE 
 
Capital Equity / assets EA positive 
Credit risk Loan loss provisions / loans PL negative 
Productivity 
growth 
Rate of change in inflation-
adjusted gross total revenue / 
personnel 
PR positive 
Operating expenses 
management Operating expenses / assets  EXP negative B
an
k-
sp
ec
ifi
c 
 
Size ln (real assets) and  ln (real assets)2 S and S
2 ? 
Ownership 
 
Dummy variable equal to one for 
privately-owned banks  
or  
market share (in terms of assets) 
of privately-owned banks 
OD  
or 
OM
positive 
In
du
st
ry
- 
sp
ec
ifi
c 
 
Concentration Herfindahl-Hirschman index H-H ? 
Inflation 
expectations 
Current period inflation rate 
(consumer prices) 
or 
10-yr bond yield 
CPI 
or 
IR 
? 
D
et
er
m
in
an
ts
 
M
ac
ro
ec
on
om
ic
  
Cyclical output 
Deviations of actual output from 
segmented trend or the 
trend calculated on the basis of 
the HP filter 
CO positive 
 
 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive statistics  
Variable      Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
ROA* 1.23   1.60 -10.81 7.94 
EA*   8.05 5.47 1.53 35.49 
PL* 2.27    2.21 0 11.77 
PR*   2.45    19.51 -68.69 124.00 
EXP* 3.65    1.53 0.71   11.06 
S   11.41    1.64 8.03     14.84 
OM   17.60   11.48 6.44 43.79 
H-H   2410    599 166 3368 
CPI* 11.97   6.45 2.60 23.00 
IR* 16.45    6.57 5.30 25.00 
CO -0.12  1.77 -5.08 2.37 
*These variables are measured in percentages 
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Table 3 
Maddala-Wu panel unit root test 
Variable ROA EA PL PR EXP S 
Test-statistic 81.460 79.378 59.050 90.448 60.553 18.855 
Critical value under the chi-squared distribution: χP2P (42) = 58.12 
 
 
 
 
Table 4 
FE and RE estimation and specification tests – Dep. variable: 
ROA 
 FE RE 
 Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept 2.293 0.42 -3.235 -0.79 
ΠBt-1B 0.357 8.17 0.444 11.12 
EA 0.052 2.79 0.035 2.22 
PL -0.090 -2.37 -0.078 -2.32 
PR 0.068 2.50 0.069 2.51 
EXP -0.179 -2.27 -0.084 -1.42 
S -0.127 -0.14 0.645 0.93 
S P2P 0.006 0.14 -0.024 -0.82 
OBD B -0.006 -0.04 0.155 0.93 
H-H -0.035 -1.96 -0.022 -1.18 
CPI 0.036 1.74 0.041 2.22 
CO 0.077 2.43 0.074 2.29 
DB99B 1.348 5.32 1.397 5.44 
 
Hausman testP1P χP2P (12) = 36.59, P-valueP P= 0.0003 
Wald test  χP2P (12) = 288.65 
Corr(vBiB, ΧBitB) 0.116 0 (assumed) 
F-statistic P2P F (12, 226) = 19.81  
F-testP3P F (20, 226) = 3.36  
RP2P-within 0.513 0.499 
RP2P-between 0.514 0.771 
RP2P-overall 0.531 0.589 
1. This is a test of the equality of the coefficients estimated by the FE and the RE 
estimators. For details see Baltagi (2001). 
2. The F-statistic of the equation (HB0B: all explanatory variables are equal to zero). 
3. The F-test that all vBi B = 0.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5 
Results of tests for time effects for models 4 and 6 
Dep. Var. LM test: λ B2 B= λ B3B … = λBT B= 0 P-value 
(4) χP2P (15) = 50.97 0.0000 
(6) χP2P (15) = 16.36 0.2921 
 34
 Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. Coef. t-stat. 
Intercept 0.021 0.46 0.010 0.23 0.021 0.37 0.006 0.120 
ΠBt-1B 0.348 8.73 0.347 8.76 0.349 8.75 0.353 8.77 
EA 0.049 2.80 0.049 2.83 0.042 2.35 0.050 2.81 
PL -0.088 -2.62 -0.086 -2.61 -0.085 -2.50 -0.090 -2.66 
PR 0.069 2.85 0.069 2.83 0.067 2.73 0.070 2.87 
EXP -0.207 -2.79 -0.208 -2.82 -0.221 -2.94 -0.185 -2.62 
S -0.190 -0.20 -0.475 -0.85 -0.306 -0.32 -0.163 -0.28 
S P2P 0.007 0.16 0.027 0.85 0.012 0.29 0.008 0.34 
OBD B -0.056 -0.24   0.017 -0.07 -0.032 -0.13 
OBMB   -0.065 -0.85     
H-H -0.031 -1.31 -0.036 -1.46 -0.031 -1.04 -0.036 -1.58 
CPI 0.038 1.96 0.039 1.97   0.039 1.990 
IR     0.043 2.61   
CO P1 P 0.077 2.68 0.077 2.68 0.075 2.05   
CO P+,2P       0.129 2.160 
CO P-,3P       0.039 0.820 
DB99 B 1.351 5.90 1.356 5.92 1.361 5.93 1.336 5.81 
     
Wald test χ P2P (12) = 262.70 χ P2P (12) = 263.10 χ P2P (12) = 262.65 χ P2P (13) = 262.04 
     
Sargan testP4P χ P2P (387) = 274.28 χ P2P (387) = 272.63 χ P2 P (387) = 271.14 χ P2 P (372) = 271.97 
     
z = -5.43 z = -5.41 z = -5.46 z = -5.48 AR (1)P5P 
p-value = 0.00  p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 p-value = 0.00 
     
z = -1.24 z = -1.29 z = -1.47 z = -1.11 AR (2)P6P 
p-value = 0.215 p-value = 0.196 p-value = 0.143 p-value = 0.265 
1. Cyclical output is calculated using the segmented trend method. Estimations using the Hodrick-Prescott  
method produced similar results. 
2. Cyclical output when the actual value is above trend, using the segmented trend method. 
3. Cyclical output when the actual value is below trend, using the segmented trend method. 
4. The test for over-identifying restrictions in GMM dynamic model estimation. 
5. Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 1 is 0 (HB0B: No autocorrelation). 
6. Arellano-Bond test that average autocovariance in residuals of order 2 is 0 (HB0B: No autocorrelation). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6 
GMM estimation with EA modeled as endogenous and PL modeled as 
predetermined   
Dep. variable: ROA 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Figure 1. Bank profitability
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Figure 2. Herfindahl-Hirschman index
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Figure 3.  Output Gap
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